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Background. There are multiple models of mental illness that inform professional and lay understanding. Few
studies have formally investigated psychiatrists’ attitudes. We aimed to measure how a group of trainee psychiatrists
understand familiar mental illnesses in terms of propositions drawn from diﬀerent models.
Method. We used a questionnaire study of a sample of trainees from South London and Maudsley National Health
Service (NHS) Foundation Trust designed to assess attitudes across eight models of mental illness (e.g. biological,
psychodynamic) and four psychiatric disorders. Methods for analysing repeated measures and a principal com-
ponents analysis (PCA) were used.
Results. No one model was endorsed by all respondents. Model endorsement varied with disorder. Attitudes to
schizophrenia were expressed with the greatest conviction across models. Overall, the ‘biological’ model was the
most strongly endorsed. The ﬁrst three components of the PCA (interpreted as dimensions around which
psychiatrists, as a group, understand mental illness) accounted for 56% of the variance. Each main component was
classiﬁed in terms of its distinctive combination of statements from diﬀerent models: PC1 33% biological versus non-
biological; PC2 12% ‘eclectic’ (combining biological, behavioural, cognitive and spiritual models); and PC3 10%
psychodynamic versus sociological.
Conclusions. Trainee psychiatrists are most committed to the biological model for schizophrenia, but in general are
not exclusively committed to any one model. As a group, they organize their attitudes towards mental illness in
terms of a biological/non-biological contrast, an ‘eclectic’ view and a psychodynamic/sociological contrast. Better
understanding of how professional group membership inﬂuences attitudes may facilitate better multidisciplinary
working.
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Introduction
Mental illness is understood in a variety of ways, both
within and between psychiatric services, and in so-
ciety more broadly (Clare, 1976; Engel, 1977; Sandler
et al. 1992; Tyrer & Steinberg, 2005; Deeley, 2006;
Broome, 2007). For example, within psychiatry, mod-
els of mental illness include biomedical, cognitive,
behavioural, psychodynamic and social perspectives
(Ghaemi, 2003; Tyrer & Steinberg, 2005). These diﬀer-
ent models inform distinct approaches to classiﬁ-
cation, explanation and treatment. They inﬂuence the
focus and methods of research (for example, whether
biological or social research is likely to reveal the most
important causes of schizophrenia) and the signiﬁ-
cance attributed to ‘symptoms’ (what they are and
what they mean) (Good, 1995; Kleinman, 1998). Some
accounts of mental illness explicitly criticize medical
or psychological models; for example, the notion that
mental illness is a ‘myth’ based on a mistaken analogy
between physical illness and psychological distress
(Szasz, 1960), or the notion that psychiatric categories
and practices are the product of a wider world view
and reﬂect the interests of society at large (Foucault,
1971; Horwitz, 2002). Some psychiatrists have adopted
these and similar perspectives in the movement
that has come to be known as ‘critical psychiatry’
(Thomas & Bracken, 2004), adding to the diversity of
approaches to understanding the subject matter of
psychiatry.
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ORIGINAL ARTICLEStudies published previously or published while
this study was in progress have attempted to measure
the way that psychiatrists, medical students and other
mental health workers reason about clinical material.
For example, a questionnaire study found that medical
students weighed both psychological and biological
factors when considering aetiology and treatment of
psychiatric disorders (Brog & Guskin, 1998). A quali-
tative study used a ‘schizophrenia vignette’ to inves-
tigate implicit models used by professionals and
clients in a Community Mental Health Team (CMHT)
(Colombo et al. 2003). Models held by diﬀerent dis-
ciplines within the CMHT informed distinct un-
derstandings of the nature of schizophrenia, the
appropriateness of care alternatives, and even rights
and obligations. Another vignette study investigated
whether a covert mind/body dichotomy still operated
in an academic department of psychiatry, despite
claims that dualism had been overcome (Miresco &
Kirmayer, 2006). It was found that if a behavioural
problem was seen as originating in psychological pro-
cesses, rather than neurobiological causes, the patients
tended to be viewed as more responsible and blame-
worthy for their symptoms.
However, none of these studies addressed how
psychiatrists draw on a range of models (including
broader cultural models) to understand diﬀerent men-
tal disorders. In the present study, we developed
a questionnaire (see Appendix, available online) to
measure how those working in mental health (here
British trainee psychiatrists) use various models to
understand clinical material. Building on research of
professional attitudes conducted at the Maudsley
hospital over 25 years ago (Toone et al. 1979), we
aimed to provide trainee psychiatrists with a range of
propositions relating to the explanation and treatment
of four diﬀerent mental disorders: schizophrenia,
major depressive disorder (MDD), antisocial person-
ality disorder (APD) and generalized anxiety disorder
(GAD). These propositions were drawn from major
explanatory models (biological, cognitive, behav-
ioural, psychodynamic and social) and from other
perspectives on mental illness (on the premise that
psychiatrists may also be inﬂuenced by these alter-
natives). Our main hypothesis was that psychiatrists
apply diﬀerent models to diﬀerent disorders. Our
second hypothesis was that there are underlying ‘di-
mensions’ that represent broader approaches that
psychiatrists, as a group, use to interpret mental ill-
ness (i.e. dimensions that relate aspects of diﬀerent
models, such as interpreting illness in terms of a
contrast between biological and non-biological ap-
proaches). Our third hypothesis was that there would
be associations between demographic variables and
these dimensions.
Method
Questionnaire development
The Maudsley Attitude Questionnaire (MAQ; online
Appendix) was developed between 2003 and 2004.
The ﬁrst part of the questionnaire comprises items
pertaining to demographic and professional back-
ground (online Appendix 1, part 1). The main body of
the questionnaire (online Appendix 1, part 2) con-
tains items formulated to probe psychiatrists’ attitudes
towards mental illness. The authors attempted to id-
entify the major conceptual paradigms (models) avail-
able to those working in mental health. We included
eight such models: biological, cognitive, behavioural,
psychodynamic, social realist, social constructivist,
nihilist, and spiritualist. Four questions were for-
mulated to attempt to capture the essence of each
model broadly in terms of aetiology, classiﬁcation, re-
search and treatment of mental disorder (see Table 1).
This gave us a questionnaire with 32 questions, each of
which was asked for four disorders as currently con-
strued by DSM-IV: schizophrenia, MDD, GAD and
APD. The 32 questions were subsequently assorted
randomly. The answers were given on a ﬁve-point
Likert scale, ranging from 1 signifying strongly dis-
agree to 5 signifying strongly agree.
A draft of part 2 of the questionnaire was circulated
to experienced clinical and research psychiatrists and
psychologists with knowledge of the models included.
Their comments and suggestions were used to make
the questions more accurate.
Pilot work
We conducted a preliminary pilot study on 10 re-
spondents to ensure that the questions and the format
of the questionnaire were clear and understandable by
the targeted respondents. The comments and criticism
received were incorporated into the ﬁnal version of the
questionnaire.
Validation study
Initially we gave the 32 randomly assorted questions
from part 2 to one senior clinician (B.T.), who did not
participate in the design of the questionnaire, and
asked him to assign each question to one of eight
paradigms. B.T. was 100% accurate.
To ensure that the questions were identiﬁable
as paradigmatic by trainees, we asked a subsample
of participants to classify each of the 32 randomly
allocated questions to one of eight paradigms after the
study was completed. Their responses were scored as
‘correct’ or ‘not correct’. The proportion of correct
responses (out of 32) was considered a measure of the
968 R. Harland et al.questionnaire’s construct validity. The power calcu-
lation, based on the assumption that psychiatrists
would achieve between 60% and 100% correct re-
sponses, showed that a sample of 15 psychiatrists
would be suﬃcient to achieve an acceptable threshold
for assessing construct validity of the questionnaire
with the lower limit of a 95% conﬁdence interval (CI)
exceeding 90% correct.
The validation sample consisted of trainee psy-
chiatrists and two consultants. The observed me-
dian validation rating was 100% (range 84.4–100%).
The two models that trainees found diﬃculty in
Table 1. Questionnaire items arranged by model (number of the item corresponds to the order of the item’s appearance in the
questionnaire)
Biological
1. The disorder results from brain dysfunction
6. The ideal classiﬁcation of the disorder would be a pathophysiological one
9. The appropriate study of the disorder involves discovery of biological markers and the eﬀects of biological interventions
17. Treatment of the disorder should be directed at underlying biological abnormalities
Cognitive
15. Maladaptive thoughts and beliefs are normally distributed in the population and it is the extreme ends of this distribution
that account for the disorder
24. The disorder is nothing other than the sum of maladaptive thoughts, beliefs and behaviours
20. The study of the disorder should concentrate on understanding cognitive distortions and reasoning errors
7. The disorder should be treated by challenging and restructuring maladaptive thoughts and beliefs
Behavioural
31. The disorder results from maladapted associative learning
3. The disorder is best approached through the study of abnormal behaviour
11. Studying the associations between antecedents and consequents in patients’ behaviour is the best basis for modiﬁcation of
the disorder
19. The behavioural problems in the disorder are best modiﬁed by associating new responses to a given stimulus
Psychodynamic
26. The disorder results from the failure to successfully complete developmental psychic stages
18. The disorder is due to unconscious factors (as deﬁned psychodynamically)
22. The structure of the disordered psyche and its unconscious mechanisms is best understood by a study of individual cases
28. Treatment of the disorder requires resolution of disturbed early object relationships
Social realist
14. Social factors such as prejudice, poor housing and unemployment are the main causes of the disorder
2. The disorder arises as a consequence of social circumstances or conditions
5. The research into the disorder should focus on the identiﬁcation of causative social factors
29. Government policies to reduce prejudice, poor housing and unemployment are the way to eradicate the disorder
Social constructionist
16. There is no universal classiﬁcation of disorder, only culturally relative classiﬁcations
32. The disorder is a culturally determined construction that reﬂects the interests and ideology of socially dominant groups
13. The disorder can only be understood in the context of local meanings and these meanings cannot be extrapolated to
universal classiﬁcations
10. Treatment of the disorder should be based on whatever folk treatments and models are accepted as appropriate by the
patient and their local community
Nihilist
23. Attempts to scientiﬁcally explain the disorder have resulted in no signiﬁcant knowledge
27. All classiﬁcations and ‘treatments’ of the disorder are myths
12. Mental health professionals have no ‘expertise’ of the disorder over and above anyone else
4. The management of the disorder is best left to the resources of the individual
Spiritual
8. Neglecting the spiritual or moral dimension of life leads to the disorder
30. The disorder is better understood through religious or spiritual insights
25. Consulting a spiritual authority can give a better understanding of the disorder than psychiatry
21. Adherence to religious or spiritual practice is the most eﬀective way of treating the disorder
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nihilist models. The other six models showed 100%
classiﬁcation accuracy. This translated into a 95% CI
for mean construct validity between 92.3% and 98.1%
(constructed by bootstrapping because more than half
of the sample achieved 100% correct classiﬁcation of
items). Thus, we were able to conﬁrm that our ques-
tionnaire had acceptable construct validity.
Data collection
The study was approved by the Ethical Committee
of the Institute of Psychiatry, King’s College London.
We sampled trainee psychiatrists from the South
London and the Maudsley National Health Service
(NHS) Foundation Trust. We wrote to every junior-
and senior-grade psychiatrist in training, sending out
questionnaires by post and email. Ninety trainees
were approached and 76 returned completed ques-
tionnaires, giving a response rate of 84%.
Statistical analysis
To reduce the number of attitude variables, the scores
for each of the four items derived from each model
were summed to form a score for the model overall,
based on the premise that the four items (aetiology,
classiﬁcation, research and treatment) within each
model (biological, behavioural, cognitive, psychody-
namic, social realist, social constructivist, nihilist and
spiritualist) probed the same construct. This reduced
the number of attitude variables from 128 to 32 per
respondent (i.e. a single summed aggregate score for
each of the eight models was applied to four dis-
orders).
To address the ﬁrst research question of whether
psychiatrists apply diﬀerent models to diﬀerent
disorders, a repeated-measures analysis of variance of
the attitude variables was carried out. Generalized
estimating equations (GEEs) for normally distributed
outcomes with an exchangeable correlation structure
(using standard errors that are robust against depar-
tures from this covariance structure) were used to
compare mean attitude scores across disorders. A
formal test of an interaction of the model by the dis-
order was performed to determine whether the atti-
tude proﬁles varied as a function of disorder.
A principal components analysis (PCA) of the
32 attitude variables across mental disorders was
carried out to identify dimensions around which psy-
chiatrists in this sample orientate their attitudes to
mental illness. A PCA is a data reduction technique
applied to ﬁnd a combination of variables that sum-
marize the overall observed variation and to reduce
the complexity of the data. The analysis yields as
many components as there are items. The resulting
principal components (PCs) are sorted in order of the
amount of variability explained, the ﬁrst component
accounting for the largest proportion of the variance
among the items, the second component accounting
for the second largest proportion that is orthogonal to
(independent of) the ﬁrst component, and so on. The
PCs are constructed as linear combinations of the
original items. The contributions of the various items
to a PC can be assessed in order to interpret the mean-
ing of a PC (or dimension).
Finally, the relationship between attitude dimen-
sions (PCA components) and demographic/pro-
fessional background variables was explored using
regression methods. For the demographic variables
that were categorical (i.e. religious beliefs), where
some of the groups had less than ﬁve cases (see
Table 2), the variables were recoded such that all sub-
groups with less than ﬁve observations were com-
bined into a single other variable and this new variable
was used for all analyses. The data were analysed with
Stata version 9 (Stata Corporation, College Station, TX,
USA).
Results
Demographics and professional background of the
respondents
The sample of trainee psychiatrists is described in
Table 2. Of the 76 respondents, 39 (51%) were male
and 37 (49%) female, with a mean age of 32 years
(S.D.=4.2, range 25–45 years). They had spent an
average of 20 years (S.D.=3.81) in education since
primary school and a median of 5 years (range 0.25–21
years) in psychiatry. One-third of the respondent
psychiatrists (34%) were apolitical, with almost as
many agnostics (25%) as there were Christians (28%).
Nine (12%) chose psychiatry before, 33 (43%) during
and 34 (45%) after medical school. Two (3%) reported
being in individual psychoanalysis. Sixty-three (83%)
of the respondent psychiatrists were engaged in
research at the time of the study, with the largest pro-
portion (20%) being involved in the ﬁeld of neuro-
imaging. There was an average of one (range 0–20)
experimental peer-reviewed paper.
Application of psychiatric models to mental
disorders
No statements were universally agreed with or dis-
agreed with. The three most agreed-with statements
(Likert score >3) from part 2 (models of mental
illness) of the MAQ were: (1) Schizophrenia: ‘The
disorder results from brain dysfunction’ [biological
model, aetiology; 65 (86%) of the respondents]; (2)
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Demographic/professional background variable
No. of
respondents (%) Mean (S.D.)
Median
(range)
Age in years 73 31.85 (4.20) (25–45)
Gender 76 – –
Female 37 (49)
Male 39 (51)
Years in education (from primary school) 73 20.35 (3.81) –
Number of years in psychiatry 76 – 5 (0.25–21)
Number of years post-registration 76 – 5 (0–20)
Grade 75 – –
SHO 34 (45)
SPR 39 (51)
Consultant (trainee post-CCST) 2 (3)
Timing of decision to enter psychiatry 76 – –
Before starting medical school 9 (12)
During medical school 33 (43)
After leaving medical school 34 (45)
Experience of psychodynamic therapy 76 – –
Supervised psychotherapy 71 (93)
Individual analysis 2 (3)
None 3 (4)
Currently engaged in research 75 – –
Yes 63 (83)
No 12 (16)
Area of research 64 – –
Neuroimaging 15 (20)
Epidemiology 14 (18)
Genetics 8 (11)
Psychopharmacology 6 (8)
Psychotherapy 3 (4)
Health service 3 (4)
Cognition 3 (4)
Neuropsychology 3 (4)
Neurophysiology 1 (1)
Forensics 1 (1)
Other 6 (8)
Number of experimental peer-reviewed papers 1 (0–20)
Number of case-study papers 0 (0–5)
Religious belief 75 – –
Agnostic 19 (25)
Atheist 20 (26)
Buddhist 2 (4)
Christian 21 (28)
Hindu 7 (9)
Jewish 2 (3)
Muslim 3 (4)
Undecided 1 (1)
Political party 74 – –
Conservative 4 (5)
Labour 24 (32)
LibDem 15 (20)
None 26 (34)
Other 5 (7)
SHO, Senior House Oﬃcer; SPR, Specialist Registrar; CCST, certiﬁcate of completion of specialist training.
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and restructuring maladaptive thoughts and beliefs’
[cognitive model, treatment; 62 (82%)]; and (3) Schizo-
phrenia: ‘The appropriate study of the disorder in-
volves discovery of biological markers and the eﬀects
of biological interventions’ [biological model, re-
search; 61 (80%)].
The three most disagreed-with statements (mean
Likert <3) were: (1) Schizophrenia: ‘The management
of the disorder is best left to the resources of the indi-
vidual’ [nihilist model, treatment; 72 (95%) of the
respondents]; (2) Schizophrenia: ‘Attempts to scien-
tiﬁcallyexplainthedisorderhaveresultedinnosigniﬁ-
cant knowledge’ [nihilist model, research; 70 (92%)];
and (3) Schizophrenia: ‘Adherence to religious or
spiritual practice may lead to the resolution of the dis-
order’ [spiritualist model, treatment; 69 (91%)].
For all further analysis, individual attitude scores
were aggregated to form total attitude scores (range
4–20) for each model and disorder. The means and
standard deviations of the aggregate scores by model
and disorder are presented in Table 3. Fig. 1 illustrates
standardized mean scores (i.e. the mean=0) to dem-
onstrate the endorsement of each paradigm by dis-
order more clearly. The y axis indicates attitude score
over the four summed questions (aetiology, classi-
ﬁcation, research and treatment) for each disorder
(schizophrenia, MDD, GAD and APD), with the mid-
point of 0 corresponding to point 3 (neutral) of the
Likert scale. The x axis shows each model category
(biological, behavioural, etc.).
Fig. 1 shows that the biological model was most
strongly endorsed for schizophrenia; this was
followed by MDD, GAD and then APD. For other
models, schizophrenia was the least endorsed. The
behavioural model was most strongly endorsed for
APD and GAD whereas the cognitive model was
most strongly endorsed for MDD. Social realist,
Table 3. Descriptive statistics for the aggregate attitude scores by model and by disorder (possible range 4–20)
Model Schizophrenia
Major depressive
disorder
Generalized anxiety
disorder
Antisocial personality
disorder
Biological 15.60 (2.89) [8–20] 14.78 (3.21) [8–20] 13.49 (3.04) [6–20] 11.41 (3.18) [6–20]
Behavioural 9.50 (2.59) [4–15] 11.64 (2.96) [4–18] 13.00 (2.87) [4–19] 13.25 (3.06) [4–19]
Cognitive 10.13 (2.48) [4–15] 12.49 (2.62) [4–18] 13.30 (2.30) [5–19] 12.81 (2.58) [7–19]
Psychodynamic 8.04 (3.35) [4–18] 9.79 (3.72) [4–18] 10.17 (3.67) [4–18] 10.93 (3.64) [4–19]
Social realist 10.89 (3.27) [4–18] 12.29 (2.79) [4–18] 11.64 (2.52) [6–18] 13.06 (2.57) [6–18]
Social constructionist 8.27 (3.23) [4–19] 8.70 (3.31) [4–19] 8.93 (3.06) [4–17] 10.15 (3.38) [4–19]
Nihilist 5.97 (2.13) [4–13] 6.13 (2.07) [4–12] 6.72 (2.28) [4–15] 8.06 (2.92) [4–19]
Spiritualist 6.11 (2.35) [4–12] 6.85 (2.64) [4–15] 6.71 (2.73) [4–15] 7.41 (3.05) [4–16]
Values are given as mean (standard deviation) [range].
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Fig. 1. Standardized mean aggregate attitude scores by model and by disorder (possible range x8t o+8). Disorders:
APD, antisocial personality disorder; D, depression; GAD, generalized anxiety disorder; S, schizophrenia. Models:
Bio, biological; Beh, behavioural; Cog, cognitive; Real, social realist; Psyd, psychodynamic; Cons, social constructionist;
Nihi, nihilist; Spir, spiritualist.
972 R. Harland et al.constructionist, psychodynamic, nihilist and spiri-
tualist models were most endorsed for APD, followed
by GAD, MDD and lastly schizophrenia. Every dis-
order had some endorsement (i.e. not strongly dis-
agreed with) by every model. When disregarding the
direction of the expressed belief (i.e. agree versus
disagree), schizophrenia yielded the greatest strength
of belief (mean=4.16, S.D.=1.43), followed by MDD
(mean=3.53, S.D.=1.43), GAD (mean=3.35, S.D.=1.18)
and APD (mean=3.08, S.D.=1.09).
The formal test for a modelrdisorder interaction on
endorsement conﬁrmed statistically signiﬁcant vary-
ing of attitude proﬁles by disorder (x
2=358, df=21,
p<0.0001). In other words, model endorsement varied
signiﬁcantly as a function of the disorder.
Dimensions of psychiatrists’ attitudes towards
mental illness
The ﬁrst three PCs extracted from 32 aggregate atti-
tude variables using the PCA accounted for 56% of the
total variance. We considered PCs in this context to be
scales or dimensions around which individuals were
orientating their attitudes to mental illness. We have
only interpreted the ﬁrst three dimensions because
they had the clearest structure. PC1 accounted for 33%
of the total variance and was labelled the ‘biological
versus non-biological’ dimension because it re-
presented the contrast between the biological and all
other models, excluding the behaviourist for which
the coeﬃcients were neutral. PC2 accounted for a
further 12% of the variance and was labelled the ‘bio-
psycho-spiritual’ or ‘eclectic’ dimension because the
coeﬃcients were highest for biological, cognitive,
behavioural and spiritual models. PC3 accounted
for a further 10% of the variance and was labelled
‘psychodynamic versus sociological’ because it rep-
resented the contrast between psychodynamic at one
end of the scale and social realist, social constructionist
and nihilist at the other. (The PCA table with item
loadings is available from the authors on request.)
Relationship between dimensions and demographic/
professional background variables
Age was negatively correlated with PC1 (r=x0.26,
n=58, p=0.048), indicating that as age of the trainees
increased so did their tendency to endorse a biological
attitude. Years in full-time education correlated nega-
tively with PC1 (r=x0.25, n=58, p=0.05) and PC3
(r=x0.30, n=58, p=0.02), indicating that more edu-
cated trainees had a greater tendency to endorse
biological and psychodynamic propositions. Religion
was signiﬁcantly associated with PC2 [F(4,54)=2.78,
p=0.04], with group ratings indicating that Hindus
had stronger eclectic attitudes than trainees holding all
other religious beliefs.
Discussion
We carried out a questionnaire survey to investigate
trainee psychiatrists’ conceptualization of common
mental disorders. The questionnaire incorporated
propositions derived from major models of mental
illness (biological, cognitive, behavioural, psycho-
dynamic and social realist) and also other perspec-
tives on the alterations in experience and behaviour
that form the subject matter of psychiatry (social
constructivist, nihilist and spiritualist). Repeated-
measures analysis of variance showed that the level
of endorsement of a given model varied with type of
disorder. The PCA revealed three underlying dimen-
sions around which psychiatrists organize their atti-
tudes towards mental illness. There were associations
between dimensions and demographic variables such
as age, years in education, and religious belief.
Demographics and sample characteristics
The trainees that took part in this study had spent
an average of 20 years in education and 5 years in
psychiatry. There was a broad representation of re-
ligious and political viewpoints, including a signiﬁ-
cant proportion expressing religious uncertainty (25%
agnostic) and political disengagement (no political
party 34%). Twelve per cent had decided on a career
in psychiatry before medical school, with the decisions
of the rest distributed equally during and after uni-
versity. Only 3% of this sample reported being in in-
dividual psychoanalysis, and the most common area
of research pursued by the sample was in the ﬁeld of
neuroimaging (20%). These proportions may be very
diﬀerent in other psychiatric training institutions; for
example, the high prevalence of neuroimaging re-
search may reﬂect opportunities (or encouragement)
for this kind of research at the adjacent Institute of
Psychiatry. However, despite high levels of self-
reported research participation, there was an average
of only one (range 0–20) experimental peer-reviewed
paper across the sample as a whole, and an absence of
published case-study papers. For a sample of trainee
psychiatrists, this may partly reﬂect the length of time
taken for research to reach publication.
Single statements
The three most endorsed single statements in this
sample suggest that diﬀerent models are linked to
speciﬁc disorders, to the extent that some disorders
may be regarded by trainees as paradigmatic exemp-
lars of the explanatory power of a given model; for
Psychiatrists’ concepts of mental illness 973example, that schizophrenia has a biological aetiology
and should be investigated through biological re-
search, whereas GAD should be treated by challeng-
ing and restructuring maladaptive thoughts and
beliefs. Two of the three least endorsed statements
derive from the nihilist perspective on schizophrenia
and suggest that, as a group, these trainees are par-
ticularly conﬁdent in their professional knowledge in
relation to this disorder.
Aggregated scores
When the scores across the four questions for each
model were aggregated, the above pattern continued,
although with some variation. Within the biological
model schizophrenia was most strongly endorsed,
whereas for all other models it was least so. Within the
biological model the psychiatrists’ agreement with
the model decreased in the order schizophrenia,
MDD, GAD and APD. Statements about APD within
the biological model recorded an approximately equal
level of agreement as the psychoanalytic model. The
cognitive model was most endorsed for MDD, where-
as the behavioural model was most endorsed for APD
and GAD (contrary to what the single statements sug-
gested). Other models (social realist, psychodynamic,
social constructionist, nihilist and spiritualist) were
most endorsed for APD, followed by GAD and MDD
and then schizophrenia. All models received some
endorsement for all disorders, including the spiritual
model, which was the least endorsed. The x
2 test
conﬁrmed that model proﬁles diﬀered signiﬁcantly
between disorders, with the strongest belief (either
agreement or disagreement with propositions from
any model) expressed for schizophrenia, followed by
MDD, GAD and then APD. In other words, schizo-
phrenia is the disorder that elicits most belief. Hence,
our main hypothesis that model endorsement varies
with disorder was supported by these ﬁndings.
PCA
The three PCs that we interpreted accounted for 56%
of the total variance. Each main component was
classiﬁed in terms of its distinctive combination of
attitudes from diﬀerent models: PC1 33% biological
versus non-biological, PC2 12% eclectic, PC3 10%
psychodynamic versus sociological. The existence of a
component indicating a distinction between biological
and non-biological items suggests that the biological
model is well delineated across disorders (according
to the PCA) and most strongly linked to schizo-
phrenia. This may reﬂect the continuing inﬂuence of
Kraepelin’s ‘biological’ postulate that psychiatric dis-
orders are caused by an underlying organic pathology,
and the linkage of this notion with the disorder
Kraepelin called ‘dementia praecox’, which Bleuler
was later to term ‘schizophrenia’ (Cutting &
Shepherd, 1987).
By contrast, the ‘eclectic’ or ‘bio-psycho-spiritual’
component seems to correspond to a broader analysis
of the individual. Being predominantly ‘bio-psycho’,
this approach to thinking about disorders recalls the
work of the inﬂuential psychiatrist Adolf Meyer and
may reﬂect the persistence of a way of thinking about
mental illness originating in his Psychobiology (Meyer,
1957; Lewis, 1967; Kendler, 2008).
The third component reveals an unpredicted con-
trast between psychodynamic items and sociological
ones. This may suggest that when psychiatrists think
about disorders in terms other than the biological
model or the broader eclectic model, they tend to re-
gard psychodynamic and sociological views as mutu-
ally exclusive. This contrast may reﬂect the diﬀering
emphases of psychodynamic and sociological ap-
proaches to psychiatric disorders. The psychodynamic
approach tends to regard disorders as the product of
real but hidden processes located in the individual in
response to key relationships (Sandler et al. 1992;
Tyrer & Steinberg, 2005), whereas the sociological ap-
proach views ‘disorders’ as a product of social pro-
cesses of various kinds (Foucault, 1971; Brown &
Harris, 1978). Hence, the answers of trainee psy-
chiatrists may reﬂect a tension between two kinds of
explanation of behaviour that relate to factors outside
of individual awareness and/or control: the psycho-
dynamic and the social. This tension is evident in prior
debates about whether ‘social’ or ‘psychodynamic’
explanations identify the most fundamental con-
straints on behaviour; for example, the sociologist and
philosopher Ernest Gellner’s attempt to explain away
psychoanalysis as a social construction (Gellner, 1985),
or the debate between Freud’s biographer Ernest Jones
and the anthropologist Bronislaw Malinowski in the
1920s as to whether the Oedipus complex is a cultural
universal (Bowker, 1973).
Considered together, the three components reveal
distinct dimensions around which this group of psy-
chiatrists organized their interpretation of mental dis-
orders. They might be thought of as constituting the
group’s model or concept of mental illness. Further
research is required to determine whether comparable
dimensions are present among psychiatrists in other
institutional settings and, if so, how these dimensions
relate to one another during clinical reasoning and
decision making.
Attitudes and demographics
That more educated trainees may be more likely to
hold biological and psychodynamic attitudes could be
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prevalent in the teaching and practice of psychiatry.
However, it is also possible that biological and psy-
chodynamic attitudes require greater technical ex-
pertise, and that those who invest the time and eﬀort
to acquire expertise are perhaps more likely to con-
sider the investment as worthwhile; conversely, atti-
tudes such as nihilism may be less age or education
dependent.
Comparisons with 1979 (Toone et al. 1979)
A previous study of trainee psychiatrists’ models of
mental illness conducted on the same site, but using a
diﬀerent questionnaire and methods, allows for cer-
tain speciﬁc comparisons. The previous study re-
corded 25% as being in individual analysis compared
to only 3% in this study. It suggested that those who
were sympathetic to analytic thinking decided to enter
psychiatry earlier, were more junior, and had an an-
tipathy to research. This was in opposition to those
with a biological or behavioural orientation. In our
study we did not ﬁnd such clear-cut ideological div-
isions. As discussed above, our results point to the
structured use of more than one model by this group
of contemporary psychiatric trainees.
Limitations and future work
This is a pilot study with a relatively small con-
venience sample from one institution. We recognise
that the nature of this sample limits our ability to
generalize. To what extent this is representative of the
wider profession either in the UK or abroad is not
addressed. Future studies using the MAQ in samples
from diﬀerent institutions could provide valuable in-
sights into institution-speciﬁc eﬀects on the views and
practices of health-care professionals. Another poten-
tial limitation is that the use of a questionnaire, and the
requirement for formal deliberation on the part of re-
spondents, may capture idealized rather than actual
attitudes present in real-world clinical situations. The
criterion validity of the current questionnaire could be
investigated by the use of qualitative studies of atti-
tudes and decision making in actual clinical situations.
In addition, test–retest reliability was not assessed in
this study. Future reliability studies need to ensure
that psychiatrists’ attitudes are measured repeatedly
over a time interval that is long enough for the later
responses not to be inﬂuenced by the earlier responses
and short enough for the true attitudes not to have
changed.
Because of the limited sample size in the current
study, the analysis was based on the assumption that
the respondents would endorse the four items within
each paradigm on an equal basis. Before creating the
aggregate scores, we assessed item correlations within
and across paradigms. Although this is not a formal
approach to determining internal consistency, we did
notice that endorsement of the cognitive treatment
item correlated more strongly with the items of other
paradigms than with the other items within the cog-
nitive paradigm. This is, perhaps, unsurprising, given
that cognitive behavioural therapy (CBT) has become
an accepted treatment across disorders even when
they are predominantly explained by non-cognitive
models (NICE, 2008).
Future studies should aim to conﬁrm empiri-
cally the structure and internal consistency of each
paradigm as reﬂected in psychiatrists’ attitudes.
Speciﬁcally, given the appropriate sample size, a fac-
tor analysis could be carried out to assess whether the
structure of the eight-factor model concurs with the
structure of the eight theoretical paradigms and to
compare an eight-factor model with models contain-
ing fewer underlying factors.
Strengths and implications
Diﬀerent models of mental illness within and between
mental health-care professions may contribute to the
frustration and lack of cohesion felt by professionals
and multi-disciplinary teams (Colombo et al. 2003).
A ﬁrst step in addressing this is understanding these
diﬀerences. Hence, future research into models of
mental illness could include junior and senior psy-
chiatrists from the original study site and from other
institutions, in addition to other mental health profes-
sionals (such as psychologists, social workers and
nurses). The present research could also eventually be
extended to include service users and the ‘lay’ public
as a basis for identifying potential sources of diﬀer-
ence and misunderstanding, and also agreement, be-
tween service providers and users (Thornicroft, 2006).
In terms of psychiatry itself, comparative research
using the MAQ in other psychiatric training settings
may reveal a general eﬀect of psychiatric training, or
the inﬂuences of diﬀerent training traditions at speciﬁc
institutions. The existence of signiﬁcant institution-
speciﬁc eﬀects would raise important questions for
training, given that an evidence-based discipline
should arguably strive to promote uniformity of per-
spective and practice among practitioners. Conver-
sely, it could be argued that uniformity of perspective
and practice cannot be achieved because psychiatry
continues to be substantially underdetermined at the
level of both theory and evidence, leading to an in-
evitable lack of consensus within and between training
institutions. It may be that even where consensus
seemingly exists (for example, that schizophrenia is
Psychiatrists’ concepts of mental illness 975best understood through the biological model), this
may itself represent a cultural lag between the atti-
tudes of clinicians (including trainees) and the evi-
dence base of current research, which, for example,
suggests schizophrenia to be a complex multi-factorial
disorder with important environmental and social
constraints on aetiology (Maccabe et al. 2006). An
alternate interpretation is that one of psychiatry’s
great strengths is that it draws freely on diﬀerent in-
tellectual disciplines and should therefore be viewed
as a ‘multi-paradigm’ science (Cooper, 2007).
Hence, further research with instruments such as
the MAQ may help to measure diﬀerences in concepts
of mental illness within and between health-care pro-
fessions. Research into concepts of mental illness may
provide a basis for determining to what extent such
diﬀerences are justiﬁed and/or should be addressed
in training and service delivery.
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